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Abstract  
The paper provides an examination into the measures of 
multidimensional inequality proposed in the past few years, their 
properties and majorization criteria. It offers a generalisation of 
Bourguignon index proposed so that it includes Tsui measures (1999) 
while preserving the virtues of Maasoumi’s method (1986) of explicitly 
acknowledging the role of parameters relevant of multivariate settings. 
An application to the Argentine data is provided to illustrate the 
decisions involved in the process of applying these measures and the 
usefulness of having appropriate criteria for the choice. 
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1  Introduction  
 
In the area of income distribution measurement, specialists have designed a great number of 
analytical tools (measures and methods) to compare distributions, some of them widely accepted 
and much studied. Extending the traditional definition of well-being to account for multiple 
dimensions requires extending also the existing techniques or, if necessary, designing new ones. 
This adaptation is not always straightforward and in the process certain value judgements are 
unavoidable.  
 
The formal analysis of multidimensional inequality was pioneered by Kolm (1977). One of his 
main contributions was to provide a number of multivariate generalisations of the Pigou-Dalton 
principle of transfer. Atkinson and Bourguignon (1982) followed Kolm’s perspective by 
developing dominance criteria to determine the conditions under which one multivariate 
distribution was more unequal than another. These dominance principles take account of the 
correlation between the distributions of the different components of well-being bringing a new 
and distinctive element of the multidimensional analysis.  
 
In practice, it is highly unlikely that dominance conditions in the multivariate context will be 
satisfied, hence leading to incomplete rankings of distributions. In these cases, multidimensional 
inequality indices become particularly attractive. They synthesise the information of each 
multidimensional distribution into a real-value measurement. Similarly to the univariate approach, 
multidimensional inequality measures have been derived using both an axiomatic approach (see 
Tsui 1995; 1999) or a direct ‘ad hoc’ one (Maasoumi 1986).  
 
The present paper provides an examination of some of the measures of multidimensional 
inequality proposed in the past years. The aim is to assess them critically whilst comparing the 
properties satisfied (distributional and otherwise). It will also emphasise the distinct roles of the 
parameters included in the formulae, not always made explicit by the authors. It is believed here 
that disregarding them renders the interpretation and proper understanding of the measures 
much more complex. We present here a generalisation of an index proposed by Bourguignon 
(1999) capturing the advantages of both Maasoumi and Tsui indices studied. The paper extends 
the analysis of a previous work (Lugo 2004) both on the measures examined and depth of the 
assessment, and on the application to Argentina utilising individual level data instead of aggregate 
(provincial) level data.  
     María Ana Lugo 
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The paper is structured as follows: in the first section, the properties and majorization criteria are 
presented. Complete additive separability – desirable property in the univariate context – cannot 
be sustained together with a majorization criterion related to the role of correlation between 
dimensions in the measure. The second section presents three sets of multidimensional inequality 
measures proposed in the literature (Bourguignon 1999; Maasoumi 1999; Tsui 1999), compares 
their characteristics and extends the family of Bourguignon indices to include Tsui’s index. The 
third section provides an application to the Argentine data to illustrate the decisions to be made 
in the process of applying these measures and the usefulness of having appropriate criteria for 




2  Definitions 
 
Let k= [1, 2, …K] be the set of attributes, i = [1,2, … n] the set of individuals (households, 
provinces, etc. ) with n > 1, and M(n) the set of n x K matrices with non-negative elements. A 
multidimensional distribution is an n x K matrix X=(xik) є M(n), where xik  + ∈\ . Let xi denote the 
row vector of attributes for the i-th individual and xk the (column) vector of the k-th attribute 
among individuals, in other words, the marginal distribution of each dimension.  
 
A multidimensional index of inequality is a function () : ( )
n IX n ℜ 6 M , i.e. a continuous real-
valued function summarising the information about a given distribution. Inevitably, each I 
implicitly or explicitly satisfies a series of properties together with some majorization criteria. In 
the literature, there are two distinct identified procedures: two-stage approach and one-step 
multidimensional inequality indices. In the former (Bourguignon 1999; Maasoumi 1986; 1999), 
the aggregation is done explicitly, arriving first at a single composite measure for each individual 
(household) expressed in some ‘well-being unit’; applying, secondly, some univariate inequality 
index. The latter (Tsui 1995; 1999), on the other hand, have implicit in the inequality measure the 
valuation function of attributes. 
 
In both strategies decisions are made inevitably over (1) the weighting structure (w1, w2,…, wK), that 
is, the extent to which each dimension is assumed to contribute to individuals’ well-being; (2) the 
degree of substitution between each pair of attributes (βkm, for all k, m: 1, 2, … K) ; and (3) the degree of 
inequality aversion in the well-being space (α). The value of these parameters will normally depend 
on a set of desirable properties of the inequality index and the underlying aggregation function2. 
                                                 
2 Weighting is usually done in one of these ways: (a) treating all dimensions equally – equal weighting (w1 = w2    María Ana Lugo 
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This is consistent both with a welfarist approach in which the function represents the way the 
society values individual levels of attributes (social welfare function, SWF) –i.e. through the 
intermediary of utility – and any non-welfarist line which it views the composite index merely as 
one possible form of summarising the information over individuals’ attributes (social evaluation 






The following set of properties – straightforward generalisations from the univariate context as 
introduced by Shorrocks (1984) – is often defined as the non-distributional properties for 
multidimensional measures of inequality (see Tsui 1999)3, set as properties or axioms. 
  
Continuity (CN): I
n(X) is continuous, that is, a small change in any attribute does not result in 
abrupt changes in the measurement of inequality.  
Anonymity (AN) - wrt individuals: In(X) does not depend on the identity of individuals, i.e. 
In(X)= In(PX ) where P is an n x n permutation matrix which interchanges the coordinates of an 
n-vector xi so that Px is a permutation of x. 
Normalisation (NM): If every individual has the same bundle of attributes (xi = x*) then there 
is complete equality and the degree of inequality is normalised to zero, i.e. In(x*, x*, …, x*)= 0. 
 
Replication Invariance (RI): replicating r  times the population without changing the 
distribution of attributes does not change the value of I
n(X), i.e. I
n r(X,X,…,X)= In(X) for any 
r∈`  
Scale Invariance (SI). An equal proportional increase of all K attributes to all n individuals does 
not affect the measurement of multidimensional inequality. If each k attribute is multiplied by the 
                                                                                                                                            
= … = wK), “from an ‘agnostic’ attitude or from the lack of information about some kind of ‘consensus’ 
view” Brandolini and D'Alessio (2001), 22. – ; (b) setting weights according to some normative criterion in 
which at least one wi ≠ wj; (c) using data-driven techniques, i.e. multivariate procedures such as factor analysis, 
principal component or cluster analysis to derive weights. If market prices for all attributes were available, 
we can also use them as the basis for the weights. Clearly, for many of the dimensions included in any 
concept of well-being, market prices do not exist. Irrespectively of the criteria used, we could also follow 
Sen’s recommendation to utilise a range of weights rather than a single set for robust results (Sen, et al. 
(1987), ). 
3 On the reasonableness of desirable properties for inequality measures, Tsui’s comment becomes relevant. 
An experiment on university students carried out by Ameil and Cowell (1992) show that “as expected there 
is no consensus on the acceptability of these axioms. In the final analysis, inequality involves interpersonal 
comparison. The axioms are in most cases ethical in nature. In the multidimensional context, there is likely 
to be even less consensus on the properties of multidimensional indices” (Tsui (1995), 254., the underlying 
is mine). Also, ‘sensible properties’ require that they are so “relative to ‘usage’, and/or logical practical 
(mathematical) considerations” (Maasoumi (1993), 167.)    María Ana Lugo 
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constant λ for all individuals, I
n(X) will not change, that is, it is homogeneous of degree zero with 
respect to each column of X, i.e. I
n(XD) = I
n(X), where D = diag(λ, λ, …, λ), λ>0, i =1, 2, … K. 
A measure satisfying this condition is said to be a relative inequality measure, i.e. what matters is the 
relative positions on individuals in the multivariate distribution, thus it is not affected by changes 
in the units of measurement4.  
Translation Invariance (TI): adding a constant a to each attribute to all individuals does not 
change the level of inequality, i.e. I
n(X + a1) = I
n(X), where 1 is a distribution matrix whose 
entries are all equal to one. In other words, I(.) should be invariant to a common change in the 
origins from which the quantities of the attributes are measured. This property is relevant for 
absolute measures of inequality5. 
 
Decomposability. In the weakest version, it implies that overall inequality can be expressed as a 
general function of the subgroup means, population sizes, and inequality values.  
I
n(X1, X2) = A[ I
n1 (X1), μ1, n1, I
n2 (X2), μ2, n2)], where X=
 (X1, X2) є M(n), X1 is a submatrix of X 
of  n1 rows/columns (individuals/attributes’ vectors) with μ1 as their vector of means, and 
similarly for X2, n2, and μ2. The aggregative function A is continuous and strictly increasing in I
n1 
(X1)  and  I
n2  (X2). We distinguish decomposability by population subgroups (DP)  and  by 
attributes (DA).  
Additive Separability (AS) is a stricter version of the D property. It implies that individual 
components of welfare are judged without reference of other persons’ welfare. A measure is said 
to be additive separable when it can be decomposed in such a way that “The total inequality can 
be expressed as the sum of a ‘within group’ inequality term and a ‘between-group’ term, where 
the within-group contribution is itself a weighted sum of the sub-group inequality values” 
(Shorrocks 1980, 614)  
                                                 
4 Strong Scale Invariance (SSI) Tsui (1995) proposes this stronger version of (SI). If each k attribute is 
multiplied by a constant λk for all individuals, I
n(X) will not change, that is, it is homogeneous of degree 
zero with respect to each column of X, i.e. I
n(XD) = I
n(X), where D = diag(λ1, λ2, …, λK), λk>0, i =1, 2, … 
K. This property merely says that the measure should be relative in each of the k-th dimensions. 
Bourguignon (1999) has argued against this property, as it is reasonable to believe that if, for instance, 
incomes are doubled the contribution of inequalities in health status to overall multidimensional inequality 
may be expected to be quite different. “As a matter of fact, not to exhibit the scale invariance property 
which is commonly postulated in the unidimensional case, may be an important and interesting feature of 
multidimensional inequality measures” (Bourguignon (1999), 479.). Scale invariance and Strong Scale 
Invariance inequality measure properties are equivalent to requiring the underlying social evaluation 
relation to be homothetic and strong homothetic (see Weymark (2006), ). 
5 Strong Translation Invariance (STI): adding a constant ak to each k attribute to all individuals does not 
change the level of inequality, i.e. I
n(X + A) = I
n (X), where A is a n x K matrix with identical rows (a1, a2, 
…, ak); i.e. I(.) is invariant to independent changes in origins. This is a generalisation of the ‘leftist’ notion 
of inequality according to Kolm’s formalisation Tsui (1995), . Translation invariance and Strong 
Translation Invariance inequality index properties are equivalent to requiring the underlying social 
evaluation relation to be translatable and strongly translatable (see Weymark (2006), ). SSI and STI would 
not be appropriate if attributes are measured in the same units.     María Ana Lugo 
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I XI X X w I X B == + ∑ , where X1 … XG represents partition of the 
distribution of X into G groups and B represents the between-group component. Once again, we 
can distinguish additive separability by population subgroups (ASP) and by attributes (ASA).  
 
These properties are interesting both because they permit computing overall inequality from sub-
group data and facilitate the study the sources of inequality. In principle, they will be particularly 
useful when working with limited datasets. Frequently, only aggregated data is available; i.e. for 
each aggregated unit (such as regions, states, provinces) we might have average levels and 
inequality value for each attribute, most commonly from different sources. Thus, it would seem 
particularly useful to be able to work with inequality indices which allow us to work in such an 
environment. If one is able to obtain some estimates of correlations between dimensions from 




2.2 Majorization criteria  
 
The list of properties satisfied by I
n(X) should be completed with majorization or dominance criteria, 
that is to say, with “partial orders ranking distributions of attributes by their degree of inequality” 
(Tsui 1999, 146) or distributional properties. The study of majorization criteria in the context of 
multidimensional indices of inequality was pioneered by Kolm (1977). The first two majorization 
criteria below deal with the spread of the distribution of attributes (extensions of the univariate 
Pigou-Dalton principle); the third addresses the issue of correlation between attributes’ 
distributions (specific of the multidimensional distribution context).  
 
One dimensional Pigou-Dalton condition extends to two distinct dominance criteria in a multiple 
dimensional context, which are not always equivalent.  
 
Uniform Pigou-Dalton Majorization (UPD)6. (, ) U P D   X XT ∈ where T is a finite product 
of Pigou-Dalton matrices and it is not a permutation matrix. A Pigou-Dalton matrix T is one 
such that  λ λλ =+ − < < (1 ) ,0 1 TE Q , where E is an identity matrix and Q is a permutation 




                                                 
6 Also known as ‘chain majorization’ in Marshall and Olkin (1979), .     María Ana Lugo 
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Uniform Majorization (UM)7.  ∈ (, ) U M X XB  where B is a (n x n) bistochastic matrix and Y 
cannot be derived by permuting by the columns of X. Intuitively, multiplying X by a bistochastic 





Both UM and UPD measure the spread of the attributes. The difference rest in the fact that 
UPD implies the property to hold for each of the marginal distribution of attributes, but the 
converse does not always hold unless K=1 or n=2.  The reason is that any T matrix is a non-
permutation bistochastic matrix but there exist some B matrix that cannot be expressed as 
product of Pigou-Dalton matrices. In other words, if each univariate distribution of dimension in  
X is Pigou-Dalton majorized by XT, still it does not necessarily imply that the multidimensional 
matrix X is Pigou-Dalton majorized by XT (Marshall and Olkin 1979). UPD implies UM but the 
reverse does not need to hold 
 
Kolm shows that UM is satisfied under one of the following (from Theorem 5 and 6, Kolm 
1977): Schur-convex inequality measures; Schur-concave SEF; individualistic and concave 
individual aggregator function and Schur-concave SEF; individualistic and concave individual 
aggregator function and quasi-concave SWF; individualistic and concave individual aggregator 
function and additive separable SEF8.  
 
Tsui (1999) introduces a majorization criterion capturing a key concept in Atkinson-Bourguignon 
(1982)’s paper related to the correlation among attributes when marginal distributions are 
unchanged, which was not previously needed. This is, in effect, the ‘innovation’ of multivariate 
inequality axiomatisation, and it is what renders the multidimensional case “intrinsically different 
from the one-dimensional case and makes assumptions on the sign of [cross-derivatives of the 
                                                 
7 a.k.a. ‘Majorization’ in (1979), ;  ‘Multidimensional version of the Principle of Transfer’ in Maasoumi 
(1986), , Maasoumi (1999), ; ‘Multidimensional generalization of the Pigou-Dalton principle’ in Tsui (1995), 
; and Uniform Majorization in Weymark (2006), . In a welfarist context, UM is equivalent to Lorenz 
dominance when the utility function belongs to the family of functions that are continuous and strictly 
concave (Kolm (1977), , Tsui (1999), ). 
8 Definitions: Schur-convex and Schur-concave (or S-concave)  as defined by Marshall and Olkin (1979):  
A real-valued function Φ defined on  ⊂ \ A is said to be Schur-convex  on  A if   on  xy ; A  
() () ⇒Φ ≥Φ xy and Schur-concave on A if   on ( ) ( ) ⇒Φ ≤Φ xy x y ; A  . Also, if the Φ(x) is Schur-convex 
(concave), the function -Φ(x) is Schur-concave (convex) and any monotonic increasing transformation of a 
Schur-concave (convex) function is also Schur-concave (convex). See Boche and Jorswieck (2004), 3..  
In the unidimensional context, S-concavity is a weaker requirement, given symmetry, than strict concavity 
and strict quasi-concavity; “it is equivalent to the Pigou-Dalton transfer condition, with symmetry” (Sen 
and Foster (1997), 134.) 
We should be careful about notation as in this context   on  xy ; A , x is majorized by y, means in fact that 
y is “less spread out” than x , that is, y is more equally distributed. It is standard to prefer y in terms of 
welfare if one values negatively inequality, but notation as coming from the ‘Theory of Majorization’ 
interprets ; in the explained form; Marshall and Olkin (1979), .     María Ana Lugo 
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underlying function] necessary” (Atkinson and Bourguignon 1982, 191) 
 
Boland and Proschan (1988) define a correlation increasing transfer as one that redistributes the 
amount of attributes between individuals i and j in such a way that i gets the lower of the two 
quantities of each attribute while j gets the higher, while the distribution of attributes among 
everyone else remains constant. Thus, when two distributions  ,( ) X Yn ∈M have equivalent 
marginal distributions in the K dimensions but differ in a way such Y is derived from X by a 
correlation increasing transfer, UPD and UM cannot rank them. Formally, Y may be derived 
from  X by a correlation increasing transfer if, for some rows i and j,  i < 
j, iij =∧ yxx  and  , jij = ∨ y xx , mm = y x   {, } mi j ∉ , where 
12 (min{ , },...,min{ , }) kk x xx y ∧= xy and ∨= x y 12 (max{ , },..., xx max{ , }) kk x y  (Boland and 
Proschan 1988).  
 
Correlation-Increasing Majorization (CIM).  ∈ ⇔ (,) C I M X Y Y can be derived from X 
by permutation of rows and a finite number of correlation increasing transfers of attributes 
among individuals. In other words, more correlation between attributes, for given marginal 
distributions, should lead to less equal allocation, that is, I
n(X) ≤ I
n(Y). This majorization criterion 
captures the idea of compensating inequalities among different attributes9.  
 
CIM majorization corresponds to the case where the social welfare function pertains to the class 
of functions
− A , i.e. the first derivatives with respect to each attribute is non-negative, and the 
cross-derivative is non-positive, and marginal distributions are identical.  The sign of the cross-
derivative of the inequality index should be non-negative.  
 
Bourguignon and Chakravarty criticise the use of CIM as a valid majorization criterion as it is 
implicitly assuming that attributes are substitutes, while “there is no a priori reason for a person 
to regard attributes as substitutes only. Some of the attributes can as well be complements” 
(Bourguignon and Chakravarty 2003, 36).  
 
Note that, by definition, additive separability by attributes (ASA) will necessarily ignore the 
correlation between dimensions, hence ignoring one of the main elements of the 
multidimensional framework. In the next section, we will see how CIM and ASA are 
inconsistent. Given the data limitations, especially in developing countries, it might be worth 
                                                 
9 Within the welfarist approach – hence the existence of utility functions intermediating attributes to well-
being - CIM is included in the two Lorenz dominance majorizations; in the Weakly Utility-based 
Majorization (WUBM) for utility functions u(.) that  are increasing and L-superadditive, and included in 
‘Utility-based Majorization’ (UBM) for continuous and strictly concave u(.)s Tsui (1999), .     María Ana Lugo 
9 
further investigating the possibility of adapting ASA in such a way as to exploit the data at hand. 
On the other hand, ASA will still be relevant in the analysis on intertemporal allocation when 
additivity (U12=0) is generally assumed, as pointed out in Atkinson and Bourguignon (1982).  
 
 
3  Multidimensional measures of inequality 
 
3.1 Maasoumi (1986, 1999)  
 
In a series of papers, Maasoumi proposes the use of a measure to compare multidimensional 
distributions of well-being, based on the theory of information (Hirschberg et al. 1991; Maasoumi 
1986; 1999; Maasoumi and Nickelsburg 1988). The index is constructed in two steps, first 
aggregating attributes for each individual (obtaining some Si function of the Xik) then applying a 
measure of inequality as in the univariate case. In both these steps, the author makes his choices 
based on “information theory”, arguing its benefits as compared to an axiomatic approach10, 
hence choosing General entropy measures for both stages.  
 
Based on the idea that different indicators of economic welfare are distributed differently, 
Maasoumi suggests an aggregator vector S with a distribution that most closely represents the 
distributional information in each attribute – which he implicitly assumes to be a desirable property. 
In particular, he proposes a multivariate generalisation of the GE  measure of divergence 
(Kullback-Leibler distance) or closeness between the K densities [as weighted sum of the pairwise 
‘divergence’ terms] and arrives at a distance measure D of the following form:  
11
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= ∑  is the weight given to the k-th attribute in the total aggregator function.  
                                                 
10 Maasoumi argues that as the GE divergence is itself justified by a set of desirable axioms of information 
theory similar to those posed by the followers of an axiomatic approach, it cannot be blamed to ignore 
them altogether. This was already made cleared by Shorrocks when first using an axiomatic approach to 
derive inequality measures. Shorrocks (1980),     María Ana Lugo 
10 
It is straightforward to see that Si is the general weighted mean with the familiar formulation of 
the CES and Cobb-Douglas functions as special cases11. Maasoumi interprets this aggregator 
function as the well-being indicator for person i. For strictly positive xik, Si is defined for all values 
of β.  
The parameter β is related to the degree of substitutability between attributes and determines the 
shape of the contours for all pair of attributes – identical for all pairs. The elasticity of 







. The smaller the β, the smaller is the elasticity of substitution 
between attributes. In the limit, as  −∞ → β , σ → 0  (i.e. no substitution between attributes) 
and the function is of Leontief type, with L-shaped contour curves as for perfect complement 
attributes, hence the worst performer attribute is the only considered in the aggregator function. 
When β = 0, σ = 1 and S i is a Cobb-Douglas function, with unit substitution elasticity. Finally, 
when β = 1, Si is a linear function of the K attributes and σ → ∞, that is, attributes are perfect 
substitutes, so that low levels on one of the attributes can be perfectly compensated by high 
levels on another. A common restriction is 1 ≤ β , so that the elasticity of substitution is non-
negative (hence convex to the origin contours) and the function is quasi-concave with respect to 
the xs, with decreasing marginal returns12. We can interpret convexity of preferences as a basic 
inclination of the economic agents for diversification. In other words, “the consumer prefers a 
more balanced (varied) bundle to a less balanced (varied) bundle” (Zamagni 1987, 139).  
 
For the second step, Maasoumi proposes an inequality index of the GE family as a measure of 
the divergence between two distributions; that is, the size distribution of S and the uniform 
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11 A strong point against the CES formulation is brought forward by Bourguignon and Chakravarty (2003), 
. They argue that extending the measure to more attributes implies assuming that the elasticity of 
substitution is the same between attributes. “This may be not very satisfactory and other more complex 
specifications have to be designed to avoid this” (p. 40). It might be worth exploring, for instance, how to 
include multi-attribute elasticity of substitution (direct Allen or Morishima elasticities)  
12 In the context of utility/welfare maximisation exercise, quasi-concavity of the objective function 
guarantees that the solution of the optimisation exercise is indeed a maximum and that the demand 
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is the mean of the well-being indicator for the n individuals and α is the 
‘inequality aversion’ parameter as in the unidimensional formulation – the lower the α the more 
sensitive to changes at the lower part of the well-being distribution. IM are normalized iso-elastic 
transformations of the utility functions Si. Theil’s first and second indices are weighted average of 
attribute inequalities, reflecting the substitution effect between attributes.  
 
It can be shown that IM  satisfies CN, AN, NM, RI, DP and AS for all cases. The other 
properties can be satisfied for limited ranges of values of parameters α and β. SI is satisfied for all 
cases except when α=1 (Theil’s first measure in the univariate context13. DA holds when α = β 
and the SWF is individualist and specific, in Kolm (1977)’s sense14 (Proposition 1 in Maasoumi 
(1986)).  
 
The two majorization criteria become rather controversial for this measure. There has been a 
debate over the satisfaction of UM, which Maasoumi originally argued was always satisfied. It 
                                                 
13 (SSI) is satisfied only when β=0 (Cobb-Douglas aggregator function) or when one works with the matrix 
of shares which  “it requires a rather unusual assertion that individual well-being depends on shares of 
attributes” Maasoumi (1999), 450.. As pointed out in footnote 4, there are valid reasons to disregard this 
property.  
14 That is if it can be written as a (F) function of individual’s (utility) functions [Si(xi)] and can be equally be 
written as a (G) function of attribute’s functions [Aj(xj)]. Kolm proves that if a SEF is both individualistic 
and specific, it must be additive [Theorem 1, Kolm 1977].     María Ana Lugo 
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was later proved –Dardanoni (1996) provides a counterexample 15– that this is not necessarily the 
case, for the measure is defined with respect to the aggregate functions of the individuals, and 
not the actual levels of attributes (Tsui 1995). In sum, UM hold for limited ranges of value of 
parameters for which the IM is Schur-convex (or the underlying SEF Schur-concave and 
everywhere increasing). The reason behind this is the fact that individuals’ well-being is 
normalised by the mean aggregator (Bourguignon 1999)16. As a result of this IM cannot be 
associated directly to a SEF (function of attributes rather than of aggregate utilities) which makes 
the interpretation and the finding of the condition for which UPD/UM hold quite problematic.  
 
An additional question remains: whether and when IM satisfy CIM. I would argue that, yet again 
because of the normalisation chosen by the author, it is not clear which are the conditions for 
CIM to be satisfied. The reason is that, any correlation increasing transfer if preserving average 
for each attribute would still change the mean of well-being as defined byS . This becomes 
apparent when obtaining the cross-partial derivative of the index with respect to two different 
attributes, which will depend on the way S  moves after the transfer.  
 
The two-stage approach to multidimensional inequality measures has the advantage that the 
aggregation of attributes – hence the SEF - is dealt directly and explicitly17. Additionally, it differs 
from the rest of the measures reviewed in that the basis of his measure is to be found in the 
theory of information rather than in the axiomatic or normative approach. Still, as the GE 
divergence is itself justified by a set of desirable axioms of information theory similar to those 
posed by the followers of an axiomatic approach, it cannot be blamed for ignoring them 
altogether. 
                                                 
15 In the example  
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Dardanoni (1996),  shows that applying any concave Si any Schur-convex inequality index will increase 
after the ‘equalising’ transformation. He also offers a second criticism to Maasoumi two-step approach and, 
in particular, a criticism to the (UPD) as a valid majorization criterion. He argues that “while having a clear 
interpretation in terms of social welfare, is uninformative for evaluating the amount of inequality in the 
society” (Dardanoni (1996), 202.. In exchange, he offers a new majorization, the so called ‘unfair 
redistribution’ (UR) which, in his view is a mild requirement. Maasoumi responds by pointing out that 
(UR) assumes that all attributes are valued equally and are perfects substitutes (β=1), and thus, Si functions 
are additive separable (AS). He discards this majorization criterion (even if it might be desirable in theory) 
because it finds the assumption of perfect substitutability of attributes rather restricted. This is also 
supported by Savaglio when he argues that “it is in contradiction with the evaluation of individual welfare 
when there are correlations between attributes of a distribution” (Savaglio (2006)). A similar argument was 
brought by Bourguignon and Chakravarty (2003) in their critique to Tsui CIM majorization. 
16 Also, because of this normalisation it does not avoid double-counting, as argued in his text.  
17 According to Maasoumi “there is an inevitable aggregation of the [K] attributes that will result in any 
scalar measure” Maasoumi (1999), 447. but this inevitability is questioned when aggregation is done in the 
first stage across individuals (Gajdos and Weymark (2005), ) or when proposing non-decomposable 
multidimensional inequality indices (Tsui (1999), ).    María Ana Lugo 
13 
 
3.2 Tsui (1995, 1999)  
 
In his two papers on multidimensional inequality indices, Tsui derives through an axiomatic 
approach, a set of admissible classes of SEF and corresponding inequality indices – both relative 
and absolute. In here, I will focus on one of the family of relative measures, which satisfies the 
most properties and majorization criteria.  
 
After defining a set of desirable axioms on the SEF18, Tsui (1995) derives a valid W(X) which is 
ordinally equivalent to  ()
iu ∑












i x  and where rk   and b are restricted so that the functions are 
increasing and strictly concave. Utilising Kolm’s relative inequality index derivation, Tsui 
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Tsui (1999) generalises the previous index in such a way as to satisfy both UPD/UM and CIM 
majorization criteria, while relaxing the property of AS to a less strict one of D20. These, together 
with the other generally agreed set of axioms lead inexorably to the class of multi-attribute 
generalized entropy measures of the following form  
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1 1
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18 These are continuity, strictly increasing with the elements of X, anonymity, strictly quasi-concave, 
decomposability, and ratio-scale invariance.  
19 The other relative index proposed also is based on an individual Cobb-Douglas function but aggregation 
across persons is done through a SEF of the Nash type, that is a product of individuals’ well-being; Tsui 
(1995), .  
20 On this the author already in 1995 noticed that “Additive separability is considered by some as rather 
restrictive … In the final analysis, whether a separability axiom of some sort is acceptable cannot be 
resolved by purely logical arguments, as are other axioms in this paper. There is also a priori no reason why 
Ax 5 may not be discarded. It follows that one may have sets of axioms without Ax 5 and yet derive the 
corresponding classes of social evaluation functions and inequality indices […] It is my conjecture that 
replacing Ax 5 by a decomposability axiom in Shorrocks will lead to a class of non-separable social 
evaluation functions embedding the class of multidimensional GE measures [introduced in 1999]. In other 
words, an aggregate function of attributes for each person is not always a necessary first step to the design 
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Where F( ) is an strictly increasing function of In( ), and value zero when In( )=0.  
 
These indices satisfy CN, AN, NM, D, RI, and RS. UM and UPD are satisfied whenever the 
(individual) function is strictly convex, hence restricting the parameters so that the corresponding 
Hessian matrix is positive semidefinite. In the case of [7], although the underlying individual 
function is similar to Maasoumi’s, UPD is satisfied because the normalisation by the ‘well-being’ of 
the average person endowed with the average level for each attribute instead of by the mean of 
individual utility. It is because of this different normalisation that  1 T I  is free from Dardanoni’s 
critique mentioned earlier.  
 
Similar to Maaosumi, CIM will be satisfied under specific values of the parameters. The 
majorization criterion will be restricted to strictly L-superadditive21, which is equivalent to the 
second partial derivative of the inequality index with respect to attributes to be positive – a similar 
condition already mentioned in Atkinson and Bourguignon (1982) though stated in terms of the 
utility function, hence with opposite sign. In terms of the indices proposed above, it will eliminate 
[8]and [9], leading to focus on [7] whenever ρcicj > 0, for i, j = 1, 2, …, K.  
 
The main criticism of Tsui formulation is that it lacks an explicit exploration of the meaning of the 
parameters in the formulas, making it particularly hard to disentangle their roles as weights, degree 
of substitution between attributes, and inequality aversion, and in fact, mixing them. This will 
become problematic when, in practice, one wants to specify the reasonable ranges of values of 
parameters.  
 
To see this more clearly we can use the Atkinson-Kolm normative approach relating social 
evaluation functions and relative inequality indices (Atkinson 1970; Kolm 1969). In an inversed 
process as utilised in Tsui (1995), we can derive from [7] the underlying SEF.  
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=−  where ye is the equally distributed equivalent income, hence I is a measure of the 
“waste due to inequality” (Weymark 2006, 9) 
 
If the SEF takes the standard form of the sum of individuals’ well-being, then  
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= ∏ which is a traditional Cobb-Douglas function, 
with constant elasticity of substitution, equal to one (β=0). Inequality is constructed as the 
aggregation of individuals with respect to their shortfall to the ‘utility’ of a fictitious individual 
endowed with the average level of all attributes, using and additive SEF. It is straightforward to see 
in [7] that [6] is obtained when ρ = -1, F( ) = I( ), Σck =1 and thus, ck = rk.  
 
The parameter ck represents both the weight and the inequality aversion component of the index. 
From the individual utility function, we see that ck determines the contribution (weight) of each 
attribute to the individual well-being. That is, how much the well-being increases or decreases with 
the increase of the attribute (first derivative), and the concavity of the function (i.e. second 
derivative) measuring the rate of return of each attribute. In this case, a logical restriction will be to 
set ck to be positive but less than 1: then,  
 
0< ck <1     will be the first boundary to the parameter.  
 
On the other hand, in the inequality index [7] ck plays the role of an inequality aversion parameter, 
that is, the different weights to changes occurred at different parts of the distribution (seen in the 
sign of the cross-partial derivative with respect to individuals for any one attribute, comparing that 
of a well-off and a less well-off person). As already mentioned, CIM will also restrict the admissible 
values of parameters so that ρcmcl > 0 is satisfied for any m, l = 1, 2, … K. 22 
                                                 
22 In the literature, critiques of these indices proposed by Tsui come from two main lines. Weymark argues 
that none of these indices are provided with a social evaluation foundation as the axiomatisation is done 




3.3 Bourguignon (1999)  
 
In his comment to Maasoumi (1999)’s article Bourguignon proposes a multidimensional inequality 
measure which provides a more direct link with (standard utilitarian) SEFs than IM, hence also with 
multidimensional stochastic dominance criteria (Kolm 1977, AB1982). The normalisation used in 
the inequality measure is similar to Tsui’s hence satisfying similar properties as there.  
 
In the same spirit as suggested in 1982, Bourguignon bases the inequality index on an individual 
cardinal function representing the ordinal preferences embedded. This is an strictly monotone and 
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where α is related to the degree of aversion of the society with respect to inequality and the 
degree of substitution is normally set to be  1 ≤ β . The related multidimensional inequality 
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Maximum social welfare (this understood as the sum of individual welfares) is achieved with 
perfect equality, giving to each person the average quantity of each attribute.  
 
If we allow for β to be equal to zero, we can present a family of multidimensional inequality 
indices, which includes Tsui’s measures. The class of indices will be  
 
                                                                                                                                            
Tsui paper, it is possible to derive the underlying SEF using Atkinson-Kolm approach, as shown here. List 
instead would focus on the fact that the indices ignore interpersonal comparisons of well-being when using 
a  “version of the somewhat controversial axiom of (additive) decomposability, which, by requiring us to 
ignore some – arguably useful – information in a distribution, is known to rule out all but entropy-based 
measures in various economic and information-theoretic contexts” (List (1999), 3.. In this case, one should 
restrict the attention to Gini family of indices. This is a valid point, which deserves further exploration 
Anderson (2004), , List (1999), , Weymark (2006), .     María Ana Lugo 
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   when    β = 0     [16] 
 
where ρ is set so that F( ) is an increasing and concave function of IB and F( ) takes value zero 
when IB = 0 [14] resembles directly Tsui’s measures whenever ck = α wk  It is now clearer that the 
ck parameters in [7] is in fact, made of two components: one related to the degree of inequality 
aversion and another reflecting each attributes contribution to total well-being.  
 
Bourguignon’s index is related to the Maasoumi’s but, at the same time, “significantly different”. 
The IB has embedded an aggregator that is a distance function. In this respect, it is similar to 
Maasoumi’s. However, in IB individual welfare is normalised – in a similar fashion to Tsui (1995) 
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23. It is, in fact, due to this different normalisation that is possible to 
study when IB satisfies desirable majorization criteria, while the issue remains uncertain for IM.  
 
IB satisfies CN, AN, and NM. Furthermore, the measure is consistent with UPD whenever β < 
1  and α < 1 and β is below some level increasing with α. SI is satisfied whereas SSI is satisfied 
only when β =0 (Cobb-Douglas SEF) which is, in itself, quite restrictive. Still, Bourguignon 
argues that not satisfying this property is in fact an interesting feature of the measure in the 
context of multidimensional inequality. As with IM, it is straightforward to show that DA holds 
when α = β.  
 
Finally, we can show that CIM holds whenever (α < β and α < 1)24 while α > 0. That is, for this 
property to be satisfied the parameters of substitutability between attributes and inequality 
aversion should maintain a specific relation. As indicated by Bourguignon (1999) this is a clear 
advantage of CES-like forms as the condition for inequality increase (decrease) after a correlation 
increasing but attribute mean preserving transfer can be expressed in terms of the partial cross-
derivative of the inequality index which, in this case, is a function of the parameters used in the 
specification of the SEF. This was already highlighted in Atkinson and Bourguignon (1982)25. In 
other words, for an index to remain CIM lower substitutability between attributes has to be 
accompanied by a higher sensitivity to the lower part of the distribution.  
 
It is obvious that the DA condition (α = β) is inconsistent with CIM for IB as both cannot hold 
simultaneously. Therefore, if we are working with aggregate data such as described previously, we 
must restrict IB to this special case for which neither CIM nor its contrary (as proposed by 
Bourguignon) are satisfied. Rather, IB will not experience any change in the measurement with 
correlation increasing but invariant mean transfers.  
 
                                                 
23 We can express IB as a linear transformation of IM.  [ ] (1 ) 1 1 (1 ) (1 )





























 is the ‘corrective term’ which is the ratio between the mean aggregator and the 
aggregator at the mean Because of this term, Bourguignon argues that Maasoumi’s measure cannot be 
directly related to a social welfare function, “which makes it difficult to interpret” Bourguignon (1999), 
478.. [NB: different from Bourguignon’s formula. I thank Koen Decancq for this correction]. 
24 Strictly speaking, also (α > β and α > 1) is a condition for CIM but it is not consistent with previous 
restrictions 
25 “Where the preferences are homothetic, but we allow concave transformations, then the sign of v12 
depends on whether the degree of relative risk aversion [α] is greater or less than 1/σ” (Atkinson and 
Bourguignon (1982), 191., where σ is the standard definition of the elasticity of substitution.     María Ana Lugo 
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We have shown that once we extend Bourguignon index to include unit elasticity of substitution, 
we arrive to a family of indices which has both the advantage of satisfying a set of desirable 
properties and majorization criteria proposed in the literature and explicitly distinguishes the 
different roles of the parameters included in the index.  
 
 
4  Application to the Argentina data  
 
In this section we present an application of the multidimensional inequality measures to the 
Argentine data. In particular, we will compare 1991 and 2001 individuals’ well-being as described 
(quite restrictively) by three dimensions: income, health, and education. Other than these, 
individuals are assumed to be homogeneous in all other relevant characteristics. The present 
exercise follows from a previous paper (Lugo, 2004) where provincial distributions were utilised. 
A great limitation of that work was that it ignored the within province inequality, which usually 
account for most part of the total inequality for any of the attributes considered. The main 
reason behind the choice was data limitations. In the present exercise we use all available 
information at the level of individuals, coming from Permanent Household Survey, Vital 
Statistics and National Population Censuses.  
 
We utilise household survey data, focusing on adult population living in the 25 most population-
wise important cities of the country. The indicators utilised are real per capita household income, life 
expectancy at birth (as given by gender and city), and years in the formal educational system (see Annex).  
 
During the 1990s Argentina went through a process of adjustment, stabilization, rapid output 
expansion, and a final collapse of the economy. In clear contrast with previous decades, in the 
first part of the 1990s, Argentina enjoyed fast economic growth and a drastic fall in inflation rates 
(Frenkel 2002; Heymann 2000). After a series of financial crises – Russia 1998, Brazil 1999 – 
followed by a substantial decline in private capital inflows, Argentina entered a recession from 
which only five or six years after, does it seem to be recovering26. The drastic movements in the 
country’s economic activity will, not surprisingly, have an effect on the level and distribution of 
the population’s well being. The 1990s represented a period of continuous deterioration of 
labour market conditions and increase in income poverty and inequality levels. In the period, the 
unemployment rate tripled while income inequality and poverty rates increased to levels of 
unprecedented magnitude (Altimir et al. 2002; Gasparini 2002; Gonzalez Rozada and Menendez 
                                                 
26 Other reasons behind the collapse of the economy relate to the continuous appreciation of the currency 
(Frenkel and Gonzalez Rozada (2000), , Heymann (2000), ) and the existence of macroeconomic policy 
inconsistencies Blejer (2002), .     María Ana Lugo 
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2002). At the same time, health and education as measured by basic indicators continued with the 
positive trends from the previous decades27.  
 
Between 1991 and 2001, on average, household per capita income decreased slightly whereas life 
expectancy and years of education both showed an average progress (Table A.1 Statistical 
Appendix). Correlation between income and education almost doubled while income and health 
and health and education were in both years significantly low. This is largely due to the nature of 
the data used, as a large part of the variation in health between individuals is being ignored (see 
Annex for explanation of the indicators). Finally, distribution among individuals as measured by 
the Gini coefficient and several GE indices worsened for income while improved for health and 
education (Table A.2). It is because of this different behaviour of the attributes (in both means 
and distributions) that the question on how we measure multivariate inequality becomes 
particularly relevant.  
 
4.1 Multidimensional inequality measurements   
 
Originally, real PCHI is measured in money units, life expectancy at birth in years, and education 
also in year of completed education. Hence, the first step into the use of an aggregate index of 
well-being inequality implies choosing a way of transforming all variables so as have the same 
unit of measurement. Naturally, the manner in which the transformation is performed will affect 
the results of the analysis. Human Development Index relies on agreed goalposts (minimum and 
maximum) and arrives at indices that fall between 0 and 1 (UNDP 1995); others, such as 
Hirschberg et al (1991, 2001) prefer variable standardisation -using the variable mean and 
variance28. In the present exercise we use the HDI approach, i.e. a simple average of the three 
indices. We apply the following general formula:  
 
                                                 
27 The positive performances during the decade of health and education indicators should be taken with 
care. Both life expectancy at birth and literacy rate are variables that tend to be rather stable and have a 
natural upward tendency. For a comprehensive understanding of achievements in these two dimensions we 
should complement the study with other indicators (e.g. avoidable deaths infant mortality rate, repetition 
and drop-out rates, assessment of education results). UNICEF (2002) opposes the improvements in IMR 
and life expectancy indicators with other less positive performances observed throughout the 1990s. In 
particular, the report emphasises the stagnation of the rate of reduction of the IMR, the constant high 
proportion of infant deaths that could be avoided though low cost interventions, and the increasing 
regional disparities of infant mortality rates. Within education achievements, school quality assessment tests 
show a decline in the performance of students in secondary education in the last five years of the decade - 
Unfortunately, these sorts of assessments were systematically performed in all provinces only since 1997.  
 
28 Hirschberg, et al. (2001),  opt for rescaling each attribute to have a mean of zero and a variance of one. 
No log transformation is made to income. This procedure of standardising the variables will result in 
indices for each dimension that have positive as well as negative values, which might be problematic when 
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As the purpose is to compare 1991 and 2001 distributions, the goalpost will be identical for both 
distributions, chosen as the minimum and maximum values across both years. The minimum 
value of health is achieved in 1991 and its maximum in 2001, while the opposite is true for 
income. In education, the variable is bounded by definition (0 to 17).  
 
We now need to set values for the parameters involved in the multidimensional indices. To 
simplify the presentation we utilise equal weight (w1 = w2 = w3 = wk = 1/3) and a range of both 
degrees of substitution and inequality aversion parameter for which reasonable boundaries are set 
normatively [β was set less than 1 so that σ is greater than zero; α is limited to values smaller than 
one]. In particular, we present results for β = [-20; -4; 0; 0.5; 1] and α = [-1; 0; 0.333; 0.5; 1]. The 
Tsui index belongs to the Bourguignon family when β= 0, ck = α wk, and ρ = -1.  
 
Table 1 presents results, with different shadings to distinguish cases in which inequality in 1991 
was higher than in 2001 (dark grey), there is no differences in the measurement (light grey), and 
2001’s inequality measurement was higher than in 1991 (white). It is apparent that there is no 
unambiguous conclusion over whether there was an improvement or worsening of the well-being 
distribution across individuals in Argentina between these two years. The conclusion will depend 
on the combination of α and β selected.  
 
Table 1. Multidimensional Inequality Index  
Adults (aged 25 and over), Argentina 1991 and 2001  
1991 > 2001 1991=2001 1991<2001  
 
1991 2001 1991 2001 1991 2001 1991 2001 1991 2001 1991 2001
Inequality aversion parameter
Maasoumi
α = -2 1.653 22.748 1.645 22.651 0.103 0.157 60.554 0.286 9.228 0.153 1.953 0.102
α = -1 0.426 0.984 0.424 0.981 0.079 0.115 0.258 0.120 0.156 0.092 0.112 0.075
α = 0 0.296 0.452 0.295 0.450 0.057 0.093 0.100 0.085 0.087 0.073 0.075 0.063
α = 0.333 0.279 0.415 0.277 0.413 0.180 0.153 0.092 0.080 0.081 0.070 0.071 0.060
α = 0.5 0.267 0.403 0.265 0.400 0.150 0.137 0.089 0.078 0.079 0.069 0.069 0.059
α = 1 0.394 0.470 0.390 0.466 0.121 0.122 0.083 0.075 0.075 0.066 0.065 0.057
α = -2 -10.914 -139.205 -10.915 -139.205 -1.141 -1.545 -429.87 -2.123 -62.034 -1.097 -11.716 -0.612
α = -1 -0.905 -1.982 -0.906 -1.982 -0.310 -0.395 -0.649 -0.330 -0.388 -0.238 -0.225 -0.150
α = 0 -0.203 -0.229 -0.203 -0.229 -0.203 -0.229 -0.203 -0.229 -0.203 -0.229 -0.203 -0.229
α = 0.333 0.106 0.110 0.106 0.111 0.087 0.077 0.047 0.040 0.036 0.030 0.016 0.013
α = 0.5 0.118 0.120 0.118 0.121 0.107 0.099 0.062 0.053 0.047 0.039 0.017 0.015
α = 1 0.044 0.010 0.046 0.012 0.139 0.129 0.080 0.068 0.054 0.044 0.000 0.000
Bourguignon 
Degree of substitution (inv related to elastiticity of subst)
β = 1 β = -20 β = 0 β = 0.333
Tsui 99
β = -4 β = 0.5
 
Source: author’s calculation 
Note: variables included in the index are per capita household income, life expectancy at birth, and years of 
completed formal education. Common measurement transformation was done following HDI approach of 
max and min goalpost.  
    María Ana Lugo 
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It is interesting that for Maasoumi’s index, β was the only parameter relevant for the conclusion – 
that is, irrespectively of the value chosen for α, 1991 presents lower inequality measurement than 
2001 when β is set less or equal to zero, whereas the contrary in true for positive degrees of 
substitutions. On the other hand, when applying Bourguignon family of measures, results are 
more mixed, showing the interplay between the two parameters α and β  
 
Understandably, one could be still rather disappointed by an ambiguous conclusion as the one 
found. Instead, we can utilise the previous analysis of conditions for satisfaction of properties 
and majorization criteria to define “preferred ranges” of parameters, thus restricting the space of 
the table where to focus. Now it becomes evident the advantage of having a measure where it’s 
properties are directly related to the value of parameters, such in the case of Bourguignon index. 
In particular, UPD will restrict β < 1 and α < 1 while CIM would make us focus on the cells 
where α < β and α > 0. In Table 1 the above restriction will force us to focus on the pair 
[α=0.333; β=0.5] for which 1991 inequality measurement is greater than 2001. If instead, one 
were to prefer the opposite of CIM – as also argued by Bourguignon to be valid when attributes 
are complement – we should focus on the pairs for which α > β and 0 < α < 1 we obtain the 
opposite results, that is, 2001 presents higher multidimensional inequality of well-being 
measurement than 199129. Unfortunately, we haven’t yet been able to identify (if possible) similar 
conditions for Maasoumi index.  
 
5  Conclusion  
 
The multidimensional inequality index proposed by Maasoumi has the noteworthy feature that it 
is clear and explicit in the role of parameters involved in the formula, hence making it easier to 
set reasonable (ranges of) values for each case. It distinguishes the different elements involved in 
any multivariate function of inequality. On the other hand, it is yet not clear when it satisfies a 
desirable set of properties and majorization criteria. Tsui suggested several inequality indices 
which, by construction, allow us to identify directly the value judgement involved in the selection 
of options at hand30. The main limitation of Tsui presentation is that it does not allow a direct 
disentangling of the meaning of parameters, hence complicating the setting of reasonable 
boundaries. Bourguignon combines the advantageous characteristics of both previous authors. In 
the present paper we extend Bourguignon formulation so as to include Tsui’s measures, while 
                                                 
29 Naturally, we would need to compute confidence intervals for each measurement to be sure whether the 
differences are statistically significant. The point of the exercise in this paper was merely illustrative, but it 
would certainly need doing for a proper comparison of two distributions. As the distribution is now know, 
a method of bootstrapping can be employed.  
30 “In the final analysis, it is unlikely to have a set of axioms that command a consensus since the problem 
at hand is inherently ethical. What seems more important is complete characterization of social evaluation 
functions and the corresponding inequality indices so that the users of these indices will have a clear 
picture of the ethical judgements implicit in them”; Tsui (1995), 261.     María Ana Lugo 
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allowing for different elasticities of substitution between attributes (even if constant for all pairs) 
and distinguishing the weights, on the one hand, and degree of inequality aversion, on the other. 
It also allows for a clear setting of conditions related to desirable majorization criteria, making 
more transparent the implications of the choice of values of parameters.  
 
Maasoumi’s proposal whilst offering an appealing method to form inequality measures, in which 
all the elements of the functions and their roles are explicitly considered, suffers from the 
weakness that it yet not clear when or whether  the principle of transfers and correlation 
increasing majorization are satisfied. Tsui propose various sets of measures encompassing this 
problem. On the other hand, Tsui falls short on the interpretation of the parameters involved in 
the inequality measures, which does not allow an easy disentangling of their meaning. 
Bourguignon presents an index dealing with some of these aspects. Some of the weaknesses of 
Maasoumi remain. 
 
More research in the area remains to be done. Among other areas of further research we should 
pursue a similar study of the multidimensional indices of the Gini family already present in the 
literature (Anderson 2004; Gajdos and Weymark 2005; Koshevoy and Mosler 1997; List 1999; 
Weymark 2006). Furthermore, it will be worth examining whether it is possible and how to 
include different elasticities of substitution for each pair of attributes and/or different inequality 
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Statistical Appendix  
 
 
Table A.1. Basic summary statistics of indicators used 
Adults (aged 25 and over), Argentina 1991 and 2001  
Source: author’s calculation, based on PHS (October spells), Vital Statistics, and National Population 
Censuses 
 
where   EX: life expectancy at birth (in years) 
EDUYEARS: years in the formal educational system 
RPCHI: Real per capita household income (monthly, pesos$) 
   
 
Table A.2. Inequality for each indicator  





Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max Pearson correlation coefficients 
year = 1991 ex eduyears rrpchi
ex 8,224,879       73.0       4.0         65.6      79.0          ex 1.00
eduyears 8,213,310       9.1         4.4         -        17.0          eduyears -0.07 1.00
rrpchi 8,224,879       239.9    356.1     2.1         11,250.0    rrpchi 0.00 0.25 1.00
year = 2001 ex eduyears rrpchi
ex 10,544,339     73.9      3.9         67.0       79.9          ex 1.00
eduyears 10,540,395     9.7        4.2         -        17.0          eduyears 0.03 1.00
rrpchi 10,544,339     238.8     290.7     1.3        7,497.9      rrpchi 0.02 0.42 1.00
1991 > 2001 1991=2001 1991<2001
Dimension Indicator
1991 2001 1991 2001 1991 2001 1991 2001 1991 2001
Health Life Expectancy at Birth (LE) 0.030 0.030 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001
Education  Years of education (eduyears) 0.375 0.350 -0.012 0.008 0.223 0.191
Income  Per capita household income - real 
and regional price correction
0.454 0.519 0.496 1.006 0.359 0.509 0.412 0.493 1.020 0.812
Inequality measures
GE α=-1 GE α=2 Gini GE α=0 GE α=1   María Ana Lugo 
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Annex . The Data 
 
•  Income: per capita household income31. Source: Permanent Household Survey, October 
spells. We adjust incomes for inflation. Unfortunately, it can only be done using the Greater 
Buenos Aires Consumer Price Index as no other option is available32. A more serious 
limitation of the present data is the lack of an index to adjust for regional price differentials. 
Indeed, different regions face different prices for goods and services, hence affecting 
individuals’ ability to convert those incomes onto goods. Throughout the 1990s prices have 
not been systematically surveyed in all provinces but only in Greater Buenos Aires. The 1996 
National Household Consumption Survey provides a price index for a basket of goods and 
services for each of the country’s six regions33. No other alternative is available at present 
and we apply it for both beginning and end of the period. Hence, we implicitly assume that 
the regional price differential in 1991 is the same as in 1997 and 2001, certainly a very 
questionable assumption. 
 
•  Health: Life expectancy at birth: average number of years a newborn person is expected 
to live if he/she passes through life subject to the age-specific death rates of a given period. 
It is the sum of the mortality rates for all ages combined, expressed in years. As life 
expectancy is an aggregate variable (not individual) we assigned to each adult the life 
expectancy corresponding to his group according to gender and city. Sources: life tables from 
Vital Statistics (Ministerio de Salud). Population per age groups from Population Censuses. 
Given the different definition of the cities used in PHS and Vital Statistics and Population 
Censuses, life expectancy was computed for the departments to which the cities belong.  
 
•  Education: Years of formal education. Sources: Permanent Household Survey, October 
spells.  As declared by the individual.  
 
                                                 
31 We don’t include household with incomplete or zero responses. This might bring some uncertainty as 
they are not distributed homogeneously across cities and has changed over time. In 1991, 22% of the 
households have incomplete incomes, while in 2001 the proportion is 12%., hence not only significant but 
also changing over time.  
32 Strictly speaking, comparisons of mean levels of incomes are relevant if the interest is on welfare instead 
of solely inequality. Scale independence of inequality measures is a desirable characteristic when studying 
inequality, i.e. invariant with respect to proportional shifts in the distributions.  
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